CVE-2026-62337: snark-verifier: Halo 2 aggregation circuit mishandles point-at-infinity proof elements

Medium

OSV id
GHSA-x26x-7f4v-cqx7
Also known as
CVE-2026-62337
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
snark-verifier
Cargo
< 0.2.6 0.2.6

How to fix it

Upgrade snark-verifier to 0.2.6 or later.

cargo update -p snark-verifier --precise 0.2.6
  • If it is an indirect dependency, `cargo update -p` still works; if a parent crate pins an older version, upgrade that crate.
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

The Halo 2 aggregation circuit could mishandle proof elements encoded as the point at infinity.

When an assigned proof point appeared in an MSM term with constant scalar one, the Halo 2 loader used a scalar-one shortcut that passed the assigned point directly into the EC sum helper. The EC sum implementation used by that path assumed its inputs were non-identity points, while assigned proof points could represent the encoded identity (0, 0).

Details

EcPointLoader::multi_scalar_multiplication partitions MSM terms by scalar and base type. For (Value::Constant(ONE), Value::Assigned(_)), the loader placed the assigned base into the non-scaled variable-base list and later passed those points to sum_with_const.

The default Halo 2 shim delegates sum_with_const to halo2-lib EccChip::sum. In affected versions, that sum helper used incomplete affine addition and assumed that every input point was non-identity. A prover-controlled proof point encoded as (0, 0) could therefore enter the final aggregation sum through the scalar-one shortcut and affect the MSM or accumulator computation.

The issue was fixed in halo2-lib by updating EccChip::sum to treat encoded identity inputs as no-ops and to return (0, 0) when the total sum is the identity. This removes the non-identity input precondition from callers such as the Halo 2 aggregation loader.

Impact

Recursive aggregation circuits using the Halo 2 loader could compute an MSM or accumulator with an identity proof element in a path whose implementation assumed non-identity inputs. This breaks the expected handling of point-at-infinity proof elements in aggregation.

Practical exploitability depends on the surrounding aggregation and final-decider checks, so this is rated medium severity.

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.