CVE-2026-71861: Chainguard SDK: AWS SigV4 token replay in auth/aws.VerifyToken — Chainguard-Audience/Chainguard-Identity binding headers not required in SignedHeaders

High CVSS 7.4

OSV id
GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv
Also known as
CVE-2026-71861
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
chainguard.dev/sdk
Go
< 0.1.107 0.1.107

How to fix it

Upgrade chainguard.dev/sdk to 0.1.107 or later.

go get chainguard.dev/sdk@v0.1.107
go mod tidy
  • Indirect Go modules are upgraded the same way (`go get module@version`).
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

The auth/aws package of the chainguard.dev/sdk Go library provides Chainguard's AWS-backed identity federation (an AWS workload proves its identity to Chainguard by signing an AWS STS GetCallerIdentity request). Its verifier, VerifyToken, reads the Chainguard-Audience and Chainguard-Identity binding headers from a presented token but does not require them to be covered by the SigV4 signature. AWS STS validates only the headers listed in SignedHeaders and ignores all others, so an attacker can take a GetCallerIdentity request that a victim signed for a different relying party, inject or rewrite those two headers after signing (without invalidating the signature), and replay it to any service that authenticates callers with VerifyToken. The binding those headers were meant to provide is therefore forgeable — a verifier-side (relying-party) authentication bypass / cross-service token replay.

Background

The package uses the standard "signed GetCallerIdentity" pattern — the same approach HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method and Kubernetes aws-iam-authenticator use: the caller signs an AWS STS GetCallerIdentity request with its AWS credentials to prove who it is, and presents that signed request as a bearer token. It has two halves:

  • GenerateToken (client): builds the GetCallerIdentity request, adds the Chainguard-Audience and Chainguard-Identity headers that bind the proof to a specific Chainguard audience (issuer) and assumable identity, SigV4-signs it, and serializes it into a token.
  • VerifyToken (relying party): decodes the token, checks those two binding headers, forwards the request to AWS STS to confirm the caller's real AWS identity (ARN), and returns it so a Chainguard token can be issued for that identity.

The binding headers exist so a proof minted for one audience/identity cannot be reused for another — a defense against cross-service replay — and their security depends entirely on being covered by the SigV4 signature.

Impact

A relying party calling auth/aws.VerifyToken can be induced to accept a GetCallerIdentity proof that a victim produced for an unrelated purpose — for example a request minted for HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method, Kubernetes aws-iam-authenticator, a different audience, or one captured from logs or a proxy — and to treat it as proof of the victim's AWS identity for an attacker-chosen audience and identity. The signed request is valid within its ~15-minute window. No access to the victim's AWS credentials is required; the attacker only needs a fresh signed GetCallerIdentity request from the victim principal.

Code that uses only auth/aws.GenerateToken (token generation) is not affected — the generator correctly includes the binding headers in the signature. Only verifiers using auth/aws.VerifyToken are affected.

Affected versions

All released versions of chainguard.dev/sdk that include auth/aws.VerifyToken, up to and including v0.1.106.

Patches

Fixed in chainguard.dev/sdk v0.1.107. The fix requires both the Chainguard-Audience and Chainguard-Identity headers to be present in the request's SigV4 SignedHeaders before their values are trusted (mirroring the mitigation HashiCorp Vault applies by requiring X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID to be signed). It additionally adds defense-in-depth checks on the request method, the STS host, and the request timestamp. Upgrade to v0.1.107 or later.

Workarounds

There is no client-side workaround; the fix is in the verifier. Operators of services that verify AWS-backed identities with VerifyToken should upgrade as soon as the patched release is available.

References
  • AWS Signature Version 4 — signed headers: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_sigv.html
  • Comparable mitigation: HashiCorp Vault requires the X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID header to appear in SignedHeaders before trusting it.
Credits

Reported by Kris Kennaway (Datadog).

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.