CVE-2026-62964: Gortex: Arbitrary file write / repo-confinement escape in `write_file` / `edit_file` / `move_inline` MCP tools → code execution

High CVSS 7.8

OSV id
GHSA-w42c-h7hr-f67p
Also known as
CVE-2026-62964
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
github.com/zzet/gortex
Go
< 0.55.0 0.55.0

How to fix it

Upgrade github.com/zzet/gortex to 0.55.0 or later.

go get github.com/zzet/gortex@v0.55.0
go mod tidy
  • Indirect Go modules are upgraded the same way (`go get module@version`).
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

Gortex is an MCP server exposing write_file, edit_file, and move_inline tools. resolveFilePath exempts absolute paths from confinement, and the write handlers — unlike read_file / get_symbol_source — never call guardSymlinkWithinRepo. A single MCP write_file call with an absolute path writes any file the daemon user can, outside every indexed repo root (AtomicWriteFile's MkdirAll auto-creates missing parents). Writing ~/.zshrc, ~/.bashrc, .git/hooks/pre-commit, or a cron/systemd unit yields code execution on the next shell/commit. This directly violates the project's own SECURITY.md invariant "File-path resolution is confined to indexed repository roots"

Affected

internal/mcp/tools_fileops.go (+ tools_move_inline.go), HEAD 28fa017 (v0.53.0). CWE-22 (Path Traversal) / CWE-73 (External Control of File Name/Path) → CWE-94 (code execution).

Vulnerable code

internal/mcp/tools_fileops.go:54-62 resolveFilePath exempts absolute paths from the repo-root confinement; the write sink at :793 (AtomicWriteFile, write_file) and :676 (edit_file) run with no guardSymlinkWithinRepo. The asymmetry is the bug: read_file (:940) and get_symbol_source do call guardSymlinkWithinRepo; the write path does not.

PoC (executed)

The PoC (internal/mcp/poc_arbitrary_write_test.go, package mcp) builds the server via the repo's own newSingleRepoServer(t) harness and invokes the real srv.handleWriteFile through the genuine mcplib.CallToolRequest shape:

=== RUN   TestPoC_ArbitraryWrite_AbsolutePathEscapesEveryRepoRoot
  indexed repo root (confinement boundary): /var/folders/.../myrepo
  handler status=created path=/var/folders/.../003/pwn.txt bytes_written=50
  PROOF: /var/folders/.../003/pwn.txt now exists with attacker bytes "OWNED-by-gortex-write_file-outside-every-repo-root"
  RCE-PATH PROOF: wrote /var/folders/.../004/victim-home/.zshrc (parent dir auto-created) -> "echo PWNED_BY_GORTEX_RCE # injected via write_file"
  VIOLATION of SECURITY.md line 17 ("It does not write to source files")
--- PASS  (go test ok)

The test asserts the handler did not return IsError and that the files exist outside every repo root. (Full PoC available on request.)

Impact

write_file / edit_file are MCP tools driven by an LLM agent. A prompt-injected or adversarial agent (the standard MCP threat model) writes any file the daemon user can — startup/hook/cron files → arbitrary code execution on the host running the daemon. Confinement (the security property SECURITY.md promises) is broken on the write path.

Severity

High — CVSS v3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N ≈ 8.x. UI:R reflects that a tool call must be elicited from the agent (standard MCP injected-tool model). The RCE is a chain (write a startup/hook file → execute on next trigger), so I:H + the code-execution path. Floor: if the deployment never exposes write tools to untrusted input, impact is lower — but the tool is shipped and the confinement guard is simply absent on the write path.

Remediation

Apply guardSymlinkWithinRepo (and reject absolute paths outside the indexed roots) on write_file / edit_file / move_inline, identically to read_file / get_symbol_source. Confinement must cover the write path.

Dedup / freshness (re-verified live)

gh api repos/zzet/gortex/security-advisories → [] (none). gh search prs/issues for resolveFilePath / guardSymlinkWithinRepo / symlink / traversal / confinement → 0 (re-verified 2026-06-27; recent merges #175-#183 touch indexer/persistence, not the write path). resolveFilePath / guardSymlinkWithinRepo are gortex-own code (not vendored). Fresh at HEAD 28fa017.

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.