CVE-2026-102945: Aether Project amf: panic on an unrecovered NGAP goroutine

Medium CVSS 4.9

OSV id
GHSA-v6w5-38cf-pcv8
Also known as
CVE-2026-102945
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
github.com/omec-project/amf
Go
< 1.7.1-0.20260725031321-d28042aaaea0 1.7.1-0.20260725031321-d28042aaaea0

How to fix it

Upgrade github.com/omec-project/amf to 1.7.1-0.20260725031321-d28042aaaea0 or later.

go get github.com/omec-project/amf@v1.7.1-0.20260725031321-d28042aaaea0
go mod tidy
  • Indirect Go modules are upgraded the same way (`go get module@version`).
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

HandlePathSwitchRequest guards the UESecurityCapabilities IE for presence but never for length, and the extensible APER type silently yields an empty bit string, so six unguarded index-zero reads panic on an unrecovered goroutine and terminate the AMF. The AMF is the control-plane entry point for a 5G core, so terminating it drops mobility management for every subscriber. Confirmed at HEAD daed5a2 (present in v3.1.5).

The defect

ngap/handler.go:

if uESecurityCapabilities != nil {                                                                              // line 3267, PRESENCE only
    amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7)   // line 3268
    ... (five more Bytes[0] reads, lines 3269-3273)
}

Six index-zero reads, all guarded only by a nil check on the containing IE. Why the bit string can be empty: the field is declared aper:"sizeExt,sizeLB:16,sizeUB:16". Because the type is EXTENSIBLE, parseBitString DISCARDS the SIZE(16) constraint when the peer sets the extension bit, and then if rawLength == 0 { return bitString, nil } returns a bit string with an empty Bytes slice and NO ERROR. So the decoder hands the handler a well-formed, error-free value whose Bytes has length zero, and the handler indexes it. The length guarantee the maintainers rely on comes from an ASN.1 SIZE constraint that the encoder rules legitimately waive on the extension path.

Verification

Proven dynamically, not by reading. Eight crafted bytes (40 00 80 00 80 00 80 00) decode cleanly through the REAL APER decoder, and the handler's exact expression then panics with "index out of range [0] with length 0". Panic discipline was checked first: the NGAP receive path has NO recover() (the only recover in the package is on SendToRan, the transmit path), so this is a genuine process kill and the AMF terminates.

Attacker model, stated conservatively: a rogue or compromised gNB on the N2 interface, which additionally needs one registered UE's AMF-UE-NGAP-ID. This is NOT reachable by a bare over-the-air UE; the realistic scenario is a compromised or malicious base station, the threat model N2 security exists to address.

Suggested fix

Check the length of Bytes before indexing, in all six places, and treat a short or empty bit string as a malformed IE with a PathSwitchRequestFailure rather than proceeding. More durably: since the SIZE constraint is waived on the extension path by design, no aper-decoded bit string can be assumed non-empty, so the same check is needed anywhere else a decoded bit string is indexed. Deduplicated against all eleven existing omec advisories and against hardening commit 030fe7c, which enumerated its sites and MISSED this handler.

Tooling

AI assistance was used while investigating. The panic was reproduced by driving the real APER decoder with crafted bytes and then the handler's exact expression, and the absence of recover() on the receive path was verified by enumeration rather than assumed. The reporter separately confirmed the six unguarded index-zero reads behind a presence-only check at HEAD.

References

Am I affected?

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.