CVE-2026-61725: sevenz-rust2: decompress builds each output path as dest.join(entry.name()) with no traversal guard, allowing a crafted .7z to write files outside the destination (Zip-Slip)
Medium CVSS 6.1
- OSV id
- GHSA-qh76-45cr-8xrc
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-61725
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| sevenz-rust2 Cargo |
< 0.21.1 | 0.21.1 |
How to fix it
Upgrade sevenz-rust2 to 0.21.1 or later.
cargo update -p sevenz-rust2 --precise 0.21.1
- If it is an indirect dependency, `cargo update -p` still works; if a parent crate pins an older version, upgrade that crate.
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
Summary
Extracting an attacker-supplied 7z archive can write files outside the destination directory. The 7z header stores each entry's path as a UTF-16 name with nothing constraining it to a relative, in-tree path. The extractor joins that name onto the destination and writes to the result without normalizing it or checking that it stays under the destination root, so an entry named ../../etc/cron.d/x or an absolute path escapes the target.
Details
In src/util/decompress.rs, decompress_impl computes the per-entry destination directly (line 140):
let dest_path = dest.join(entry.name());
extract_fn(entry, reader, &dest_path)
default_entry_extract_fn (line 154) then acts on that path:
let file = File::create(path)
.map_err(|e| Error::file_open(e, path.to_string_lossy().to_string()))?;
There is no normalization, no dest_path.starts_with(dest) check, and no symlink-entry handling. Path::join discards the base when the joined component is absolute, and .. components are not collapsed against the base. The convenience entry points (decompress, decompress_file, decompress_with_password, decompress_file_with_password) all route through decompress_impl with default_entry_extract_fn, so the default API is affected.
The trust boundary is the archive bytes. Any caller that extracts an untrusted .7z reaches the sink.
PoC
- Build a
.7zwhoseFilesInfocontains an entry named../../../../tmp/pwned(or, on Windows, an absolute path such asC:\Windows\Temp\pwned). - Call
sevenz_rust2::decompress_file("evil.7z", "./out"). - The file is created at the traversed location outside
./out. Targeting a startup/cron path or a config file turns the write into code execution or persistence.
Impact
Arbitrary file write outside the intended directory (CWE-22 / CWE-23, the Zip-Slip class). On extraction of an attacker-controlled archive, an entry overwrites files outside the destination — config, cron, autostart, or build artifacts — which can escalate to code execution. Reachable by upload-handling backends, malware-analysis sandboxes, mod/game installers, and CI steps that unpack user-supplied 7z files.
Suggested remediation
Reject any entry whose name contains a ParentDir, RootDir, or Prefix component, or canonicalize the joined path and verify starts_with(dest) before creating it. Apply the guard inside default_entry_extract_fn (and decompress_impl) so the hardening is the default rather than left to each caller. Reject or explicitly opt-in symlink entries.
Maintainer response
This issue was patched with ef760b61f3535ac8b93006212aef41bfebc237eb and released as v0.21.1 to crates.io
Consumers that extract attacker-supplied archives received over a network without user interaction should re-score as AV:N/UI:N (≈8.6).
References
- GHSA-qh76-45cr-8xrc on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/hasenbanck/sevenz-rust2/security/advisories/GHSA-qh76-45cr-8xrc
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61725
- Web: https://github.com/hasenbanck/sevenz-rust2/commit/ef760b61f3535ac8b93006212aef41bfebc237eb
- Package: https://github.com/hasenbanck/sevenz-rust2
Am I affected?
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About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.