CVE-2026-130008: sqlite-mcp: Read-only mode bypass via statement chaining and SQL injection in describe_table

High CVSS 8.2

OSV id
GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f
Also known as
CVE-2026-130008
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp
Go
< 0.1.2 0.1.2

How to fix it

Upgrade github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp to 0.1.2 or later.

go get github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp@v0.1.2
go mod tidy
  • Indirect Go modules are upgraded the same way (`go get module@version`).
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

In read-only mode (the default), a client that can call the MCP tools can write to the database the server is meant to expose read-only, read other SQLite files, and create new SQLite files anywhere the server process can write. There are two ways in: statement chaining through execute_query, and SQL injection through describe_table.

Details
  • Statement chaining in execute_query. The only check was that the query starts with SELECT. The modernc.org/sqlite driver runs every ;-separated statement in one call, so anything after SELECT 1; ran unchecked.
  • SQL injection in describe_table. The table_name argument was interpolated into PRAGMA table_info(%s) with no guard.
  • Escaping read-only mode. Through either path, ATTACH DATABASE opens a file read-write regardless of the main connection's mode=ro. Attaching the protected database itself made it writable. Attaching another path read that file, or created it if it did not exist.

Read-write mode is not affected beyond its intended capabilities, apart from ATTACH reaching files other than the configured database.

Impact
  • Modify the database that read-only mode is meant to protect.
  • Read any SQLite database file the server process can read.
  • Create new SQLite-format files anywhere the server process can write, or write to existing SQLite or empty files. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged.

The server has no built-in authentication and, by default, listens on :8080 on all interfaces. Unless it is deployed behind an authenticating proxy, anyone who can reach that port can exploit this.

Patches

Fixed in v0.1.2:

  • ATTACH is disabled in the engine (SQLITE_LIMIT_ATTACHED set to 0) on every connection that runs a statement.
  • Read-only connections set query_only.
  • execute_query rejects input that contains more than one statement.
  • describe_table passes the table name as a bound parameter.
Workarounds

Upgrade to v0.1.2. If you cannot upgrade, don't expose the server to untrusted clients: keep it on a loopback or private interface, or run it behind an authenticating proxy such as ToolHive. Mount only the database you intend to expose, read-only at the filesystem or container level.

Credits

Reported by @bebold6133.

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.