CVE-2026-61713: Servo Sandbox bypass: declarative refresh can auto-navigate a sandboxed iframe

High CVSS 8.3

OSV id
GHSA-pxh3-4qqv-58mg
Also known as
CVE-2026-61713
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
servo
Cargo
< 0.3.0 0.3.0

How to fix it

Upgrade servo to 0.3.0 or later.

cargo update -p servo --precise 0.3.0
  • If it is an indirect dependency, `cargo update -p` still works; if a parent crate pins an older version, upgrade that crate.
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

A sandboxed iframe can auto-navigate itself via declarative refresh even when automatic features should be blocked. This allows attacker-controlled embedded content to redirect itself without user action.

Summary

Servo allows a sandboxed iframe to auto-navigate itself via declarative refresh in configurations that should block automatic features.

The issue reproduces in the must-block rows of the matrix:

  • sandbox=""
  • sandbox="allow-same-origin"
  • sandbox="allow-forms"
  • sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-forms"

This is a client-side sandbox-policy bypass. It does not by itself prove script execution or parent DOM access, but it does let attacker-controlled sandboxed content redirect itself without user action.

Details

The declarative refresh path is missing sandbox enforcement:

  • [components/script/dom/document/document.rs:239] RefreshRedirectDue::invoke() contains TODO: check sandbox
  • [components/script/dom/document/document.rs:4522] the refresh scheduler contains TODO: handle active sandboxing flag

The implementation currently schedules and executes the refresh without enforcing the sandboxed automatic-features restriction described by the HTML spec comments in the same code.

What I observed:

  • In Servo, the must-block rows above navigated successfully.
  • In Chrome, the same rows were blocked.
PoC

Serve the HTML files in this folder over HTTP.

Files:

Steps:

  1. Open viewer.html over HTTP.
  2. The page shows a visible sandboxed iframe.
  3. In a correct browser, the iframe stays on child.html.
  4. In Servo, the iframe visibly turns into the success.html page.
Impact

This is a client-side sandbox-policy bypass.

Confirmed impact:

  • autonomous iframe self-navigation in sandbox configurations that should block it
  • framed phishing / content swap after initial render
  • redirect loops / annoyance / limited DoS

References

Am I affected?

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.