CVE-2026-69157: Atomic Server: Unauthenticated `/setup` invite grants write access to the entire Drive
Critical CVSS 9.8
- OSV id
- GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-69157
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| atomic-server Cargo |
>= 0.29.0, <= 0.40.1 | after 0.40.1 |
How to fix it
No fix yet. No fixed version of atomic-server has been released yet.
- Check the advisory and its references below for a workaround or a configuration change that turns off the affected feature.
- Limit exposure: don't pass untrusted input to the affected code path, and keep it off public endpoints if you can.
- Pin away from the affected versions if an older release is not affected, or consider replacing the package.
- Watch for the fix: a free AIssue account checks your lockfiles every day and emails you when a fixed version is released.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
Summary
atomic-server provisions a well-known invite at {server}/setup with write = true, target = the Drive root, and usagesLeft = 1. Invite redemption ignores the redeemer's identity (for_agent: _ in server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An unauthenticated attacker who sends GET /setup?public-key=<attacker_key> has the server create a new Agent and grant it write access to the entire Drive. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.
Severity
Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8). No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.
Affected component
server/src/appstate.rs— creates the/setupinvite targeting the Drive root withwrite=true,usagesLeft=1.server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173—construct_invite_redirectdestructuresfor_agent: _(redeemer identity discarded);?public-key=→Agent::new_from_public_key→add_rights(agent, target, write=true).
Steps to Reproduce
Environment: joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop in Docker, http://localhost:9883, fresh store. No auth headers are used.
Confirm the invite is live —
GET /setup(Accept:application/ad+json) showsinvite/write = true,invite/target = http://localhost:9883(Drive root),usagesLeft = 1.Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key:
GET /setup?public-key=q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM%3D HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
Accept: application/ad+json
Response 200 OK returns a Redirect confirming the new agent:
{
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/invite/redirectAgent":
"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=",
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/isA": ["https://atomicdata.dev/classes/Redirect"]
}
GET /shows the attacker is now in the Drive'swritearray:
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/write": [
"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...", // legit root
"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=" // ATTACKER
]
- The attacker signs a normal Commit (ed25519 over the JCS-canonical commit) and
POST /commit(200) — the Drive root was successfully edited. Write access proven.
Expected: /setup must require operator authentication / a one-time secret.
Actual: Any unauthenticated client on the network redeems it and gains Drive-wide write.
Impact
Unauthenticated write to the entire Drive: read/modify/delete any resource, create/alter Agents, reconfigure permissions. This is a complete takeover on a fresh deployment. (It also serves as the entry point of a larger chain: with write access, an attacker can read the server root private key and impersonate root — reported separately.)
Remediation
- Require a one-time secret (printed to stdout at startup) or operator authentication to redeem
/setup. - Invalidate
/setupafter first use with an atomicusagesLeftdecrement (sled transaction) — the current read-check-decrement is a TOCTOU that allows a single-use invite to be redeemed multiple times concurrently. - Fix the inverted invite-expiry check in
invite.rs(if expires > now { reject }is backwards, so expired invites remain redeemable and valid ones are rejected).
References
- GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69157
- Web: https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/98517d8921c78bd9b728a2459378c184ebf8a969
- Package: https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server
Am I affected?
Upload or paste your lockfile. We check every package version in it against OSV.dev, this advisory included, and email you the vulnerable ones with the version that fixes them. Free, and no account needed.
About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.