CVE-2026-107853: tiny-secp256k1: Stale buffer after ignored wasm failure accepts invalid infinity tweak

Medium

OSV id
GHSA-hj9c-qx2w-g7mh
Also known as
CVE-2026-107853
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
tiny-secp256k1
npm
>= 2.1.0, < 2.2.5 2.2.5
@bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs
npm
>= 2.2.2, < 2.2.5 2.2.5

How to fix it

tiny-secp256k1 (npm)

Upgrade tiny-secp256k1 to 2.2.5 or later.

npm install tiny-secp256k1@2.2.5
# if it is an indirect dependency: npm update tiny-secp256k1 (or npm audit fix)
  • If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or force the version with "overrides" (npm), "resolutions" (Yarn) or "pnpm.overrides" (pnpm) in package.json.
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

@bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs (npm)

Upgrade @bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs to 2.2.5 or later.

npm install @bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs@2.2.5
# if it is an indirect dependency: npm update @bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs (or npm audit fix)
  • If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or force the version with "overrides" (npm), "resolutions" (Yarn) or "pnpm.overrides" (pnpm) in package.json.
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

The three-argument xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck path ignores the wasm failure return and compares an unchanged input buffer. When the tweak result is the point at infinity, this stale-buffer comparison can return true for an invalid derivation.

Details

xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck in index.ts has two code paths. The path taken when the caller omits tweakParity discards the return value of the wasm call and compares whatever the shared input buffer holds.

try {
    X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.set(point);
    X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT2.set(resultToCheck);
    TWEAK_INPUT.set(tweak);
    if (hasParity) {
      return wasm.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(tweakParity) === 1;
    } else {
      wasm.xOnlyPointAddTweak();
      const newKey = X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.slice(
        0,
        validate.X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE
      );
      return compare(newKey, resultToCheck) === 0;
    }

x_only_point_add_tweak in lib.rs returns -1 and leaves X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT untouched when the tweak addition fails.

pub extern "C" fn x_only_point_add_tweak() -> i32 {
    unsafe {
        let mut xonly_pk = jstry!(x_only_pubkey_parse(X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.as_ptr()), 0);
        let mut pubkey = PublicKey::new();
        if secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(
            get_context(),
            &mut pubkey,
            &xonly_pk,
            TWEAK_INPUT.as_ptr(),
        ) != 1
        {
            // infinity point
            return -1;
        }

The buffer still holds point, which the caller wrote immediately before the call. newKey therefore equals point, and the comparison against resultToCheck succeeds whenever the caller passes resultToCheck equal to point.

secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add in upstream main_impl.h returns 0 only when the internal key fails to load or the tweak helper fails.

if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk, internal_pubkey)
    || !secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(&pk, tweak32)) {
    return 0;
}

The helper in secp256k1.c fails on scalar overflow or on an infinite result.

static int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(secp256k1_ge *p, const unsigned char *tweak32) {
    secp256k1_scalar term;
    int overflow = 0;
    secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak32, &overflow);
    return !overflow && secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(p, &term);
}

validateTweak in validate.ts already rejects a tweak at or above the group order, so overflow is excluded and the only remaining cause is lift_x(point) + tweak * G reaching the point at infinity.

The parity path is correct for the same input. secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check returns 0 in that case. The two documented forms of the same check disagree.

xOnlyPointAddTweak also disagrees with the check, returning null for the exact inputs the check accepts.

The condition is untested. schnorr.js skips every xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck assertion for the infinity vectors present in its own fixtures.

const res = secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweak(f.pubkey, f.tweak);
if (f.result === null) {
  t.same(res, f.result, `xOnlyPointAddTweak returns null when G pubkey and n - 1 tweak used`);
  continue;
}
PoC

Both witnesses are already present in the project fixtures at schnorr.json as the two vectors with a null result, and both pass every validator in validate.ts.

import * as secp256k1 from "tiny-secp256k1";

const hex = (s) => Uint8Array.from(Buffer.from(s, "hex"));

// x coordinate of G, and the tweak n - 1
const point = hex("79be667ef9dcbbac55a06295ce870b07029bfcdb2dce28d959f2815b16f81798");
const tweak = hex("fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd0364140");

// lift_x(point) + tweak * G is the point at infinity, no tweaked key exists
console.log(secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweak(point, tweak));
// null

console.log(secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(point, tweak, point, 0));
// false   correct, the parity form uses the C check

console.log(secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(point, tweak, point));
// true    wrong, the three argument form compares point against itself

A second witness from the same fixture uses the x coordinate of 2 * G with tweak n - 2.

const point2 = hex("c6047f9441ed7d6d3045406e95c07cd85c778e4b8cef3ca7abac09b95c709ee5");
const tweak2 = hex("fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd036413f");
console.log(secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(point2, tweak2, point2));   // true

Both were executed against the published secp256k1.wasm from npm 2.2.4 under wasmtime, driving the exports through the exact write, call, slice, zero sequence index.ts performs.

``` -- witness x(G), n-1 xOnlyPointAddTweak(P, t) = None check(P, t, P, parity=0) = False check(P, t, P, parity=1) = False check(P, t, P) 3-arg form = True raw wasm return = -1 buffer after call unchanged = True 79be667ef9dcbbac55a06295ce870b07029bfcdb2dce28d959f2815b16f81798

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.