CVE-2026-115578: go-guerrilla crashes on a bare XCLIENT command (7-byte slice off-by-one panic)

High CVSS 7.5

OSV id
GHSA-hghq-53p7-c582
Also known as
CVE-2026-115578
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
github.com/phires/go-guerrilla
Go
1 listed versions not fixed yet
github.com/phires/go-guerrilla
Go
< 1.6.7-1 1.6.7-1

How to fix it

github.com/phires/go-guerrilla (Go)

No fix yet. No fixed version of github.com/phires/go-guerrilla has been released yet.

  • Check the advisory and its references below for a workaround or a configuration change that turns off the affected feature.
  • Limit exposure: don't pass untrusted input to the affected code path, and keep it off public endpoints if you can.
  • Pin away from the affected versions if an older release is not affected, or consider replacing the package.
  • Watch for the fix: a free AIssue account checks your lockfiles every day and emails you when a fixed version is released.

github.com/phires/go-guerrilla (Go)

Upgrade github.com/phires/go-guerrilla to 1.6.7-1 or later.

go get github.com/phires/go-guerrilla@v1.6.7-1
go mod tidy
  • Indirect Go modules are upgraded the same way (`go get module@version`).
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

The defect

Confirmed at HEAD. server.go: cmdXCLIENT = []byte("XCLIENT") is 7 bytes (line 78), so the dispatch match cmdXCLIENT.match(cmd) only guarantees len(input) >= 7. The handler then slices input[8:] (line 586):

case sc.XClientOn && cmdXCLIENT.match(cmd):
    if toks := bytes.Split(input[8:], []byte{' '}); len(toks) > 0 {   // line 586

A client sending the bare command XCLIENT (exactly 7 bytes) hits input[8:7] and panics runtime error: slice bounds out of range [8:7]. handleClient runs in the per-connection goroutine (server.go:391) which has no recover(); the only recover() calls are in the backend mail-processing workers (a different goroutine never reached during command parsing), so the unrecovered panic crashes the whole SMTP daemon.

Input and attacker

Connect to the SMTP port, then send XCLIENT\r\n (a bare LF also works; no HELO needed). Precondition: xclient_on: true (off by default, but a documented nginx-fronted deployment; go-guerrilla does not restrict who may send XCLIENT). Attacker model: any unauthenticated client on the SMTP port.

Verification level

EXECUTED with a negative control (agent-run, driving the real server.handleClient with XClientOn=true over the suite's mock net.Conn). The bare XCLIENT panics with the exact OOB; the negative control XCLIENT with a trailing space (8 bytes) does not panic and returns 250. The upstream TestXClient tests XCLIENT ADDR=... and XCLIENT c but never the bare 7-byte form (the missing regression case). I independently re-confirmed at HEAD that cmdXCLIENT is 7 bytes (server.go:78), that the handler slices input[8:] (server.go:586), and that handleClient (server.go:391) has no recover. NOT verified: did not stand up a standalone daemon on a real socket to observe OS-level process exit (used the mock net.Conn plus the traced absence of recover; crash-to-exit is standard Go runtime behavior).

Suggested fix

Guard the slice against the exact-verb-length case: require len(input) > len(cmdXCLIENT)+1 (or slice at the verb length and trim) before input[8:]. A recover in the per-connection handleClient loop would also contain any residual command-parse panic to the single connection.

Also checked and SOUND

The rfc5321 recursive-descent parser (MAIL/RCPT/HELO/EHLO/address) is bounds-safe (next()/peek() return 0 at EOF), and the line/size/recipient caps are enforced. XCLIENT is the only off-by-one; every other command arm slices exactly at its verb length.

Advisory-source note

Five-source enumeration (repo advisories, OSV, NVD, the global GitHub DB, no vendor CNA) shows the PROXY-header IP-spoof bug (CVE-2025-31135, fixed v1.6.7) is the only published advisory; this XCLIENT panic is undisclosed and not contested.

Dedup

Dedup gate clean: no phires/go-guerrilla blocking verdict in COVERED-INDEX, DISCLOSURE-INDEX or SCOUT-EXCLUDE.

Tooling

AI assistance was used while investigating. The panic is executed-verified with a negative control (a bare XCLIENT crashes the real handleClient while XCLIENT with a trailing space returns 250), and the reporter confirmed at HEAD that cmdXCLIENT is 7 bytes while the handler slices input[8:] on a per-connection goroutine with no recover.

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.