CVE-2026-96637: Pillow: Decompression bomb check bypass in SpiderImagePlugin.seek() leads to unbounded allocation DoS
High
- OSV id
- GHSA-g842-9rc4-69pw
- Also known as
- BIT-pillow-2026-96637, CVE-2026-96637, PYSEC-2026-4338
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| pillow PyPI |
< 13.0.0 | 13.0.0 |
Versions we track that it affects: pillow 10.4.0
How to fix it
Upgrade pillow to 13.0.0 or later.
# in requirements.txt: change the line to pillow==13.0.0
pip install -r requirements.txt
- If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or add a minimum version constraint for it (e.g. in constraints.txt, or as a dependency in pyproject.toml).
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
Summary
SpiderImagePlugin's seek() bypasses the decompression bomb check, allowing a tiny (<1KB) crafted SPIDER stack file to trigger a multi-gigabyte allocation on im.load().
Affected versions
All versions up to and including current HEAD (v13.0.0.dev0, commit e7a7ea84)
Root cause
Image.open() runs Image.decompressionbomb_check(im.size) exactly once, in opencore (src/PIL/Image.py:3668), right after the initial _open().
SPIDER stack files are multi-frame: SpiderImageFile.seek(frame) (SpiderImagePlugin.py:179-190) computes an attacker-influenced stkoffset and calls self._open() AGAIN directly (line 190) — NOT through Image.open(). _open() re-parses a fresh 27-float header at that offset and reassigns:
self._size = int(h[12]), int(h[2]) # SpiderImagePlugin.py:131
straight from unvalidated header floats (isSpiderHeader only checks internal labrec*lenbyt==labbyt consistency, never bounds nsam/nrow). No bomb check runs on this new size.
On the subsequent load(), ImageFile.load_prepare() (ImageFile.py:436-437) executes self.im = Image.core.new(self.mode, self.size) with the unchecked, attacker-chosen size. Mode is always "F" (4 bytes/pixel), so e.g. 40000x40000 = 6.4 GB.
Why this is a real bug
Sibling multi-frame plugins DO re-check on their alternate paths:
- GifImagePlugin.py:286 - Image.decompressionbomb_check(self._size) (in seek)
- TiffImagePlugin.py:1309 - Image.decompressionbomb_check(self.tilesize)
- IcnsImagePlugin.py:121/138, IcoImagePlugin.py:236/240 (sub-image selection)
SpiderImagePlugin has NO bomb check anywhere. This is the same class of bug just fixed for GdImageFile (GHSA-phj9-mv4w-65pm) and the FontFile classes (GHSA-5x94/8v84/45hq): an allocation reached on a non-Image.open() path sized by an attacker header field, independent of the one-time pixel bomb check.
Reproduction
Python 3.13, Pillow HEAD e7a7ea84
Attached: pillowpocspider_bomb.py
Sets Image.MAXIMAGEPIXELS=5000, then:
- CONTROL: Image.open(standalone 100x100 SPIDER) -> DecompressionBombWarning fires correctly.
- BYPASS: Image.open(stack, frame0=1x1) passes; im.seek(1) sets size (100,100) with NO DecompressionBombWarning/Error -> the check is bypassed.
Real-world impact: a large frame-1 nsam/nrow (e.g. 40000x40000) causes im.load() to allocate ~6.4 GB (mode F) with the bomb check fully bypassed, from a file under 1 KB.
Suggested fix
Call Image.decompressionbomb_check(self.size) at the end of SpiderImageFile._open() (or in seek() after _open()), mirroring GifImagePlugin / TiffImagePlugin. Optionally validate nsam/nrow are positive and sane in _open().
Credit: Yazan Balawneh - CyStack Security Team pillowpocspider_bomb.py
References
- GHSA-g842-9rc4-69pw on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-g842-9rc4-69pw
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96637
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/pull/10076
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/7cb0e02389d8aac2a60896a490f572db0b07b841
- Package: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/releases/tag/13.0.0
Am I affected?
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About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.