CVE-2026-128137: NLTK corpus-reader view methods bypass the scoped root sandbox via intermediate-directory symlinks
Medium CVSS 5.5
- OSV id
- GHSA-g58v-j9g9-5gfg
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-128137
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| nltk PyPI |
>= 3.9.4, < 3.10.4 | 3.10.4 |
How to fix it
Upgrade nltk to 3.10.4 or later.
# in requirements.txt: change the line to nltk==3.10.4
pip install -r requirements.txt
- If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or add a minimum version constraint for it (e.g. in constraints.txt, or as a dependency in pyproject.toml).
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
affected: PyPI
nltk>= 3.9.4—CorpusReader.abspaths()/abspath()and thePlaintextCorpusReader/SyntaxCorpusReaderview methods dynamically reproduced:nltk3.9.4(8/9, scoped-escape checks),3.10.3(wheel, 9/9 checks) andmaster6818767b9(9/9 checks)
Source references (file:line) are to commit 303f6e2b (release tag v3.10.3). Line numbers in the released nltk wheel match this tag exactly; master 6818767b9 contains the same code (pathsec.py renumbered by +44 lines from added hardening comments). In 3.9.4 the same logic exists at earlier line numbers (api.py:222-236 for open(), api.py:161-203 for abspath()/abspaths(), data.py:382-388 for the pointer open, pathsec.py:105-114 for the scoped branch); the affected code is identical.
Summary
CorpusReader.open() (nltk/corpus/reader/api.py:235-257) is NLTK's hardened file-access entry point: after a lexical guard it calls validate_path(..., required_root=self._root) (api.py:246-249), and the scoped branch of pathsec.validate_path (nltk/pathsec.py:168-179) resolves symlinks and raises ValueError when the resolved target is not inside the corpus root. The view methods do not use this entry point: PlaintextCorpusReader.words/sents/paras (nltk/corpus/reader/plaintext.py:67-118) and SyntaxCorpusReader.parsed_sents/tagged_sents/sents/tagged_words/words (api.py:473-519) build their streams from self.abspaths(fileids, ...) (api.py:174-217), which only does a lexical self._root.join(fileid) (nltk/data.py:452-469) and returns a FileSystemPathPointer. That pointer is opened via FileSystemPathPointer.open() → pathsec.open(raw_path, "rb") with required_root left at its default None (data.py:438-447, nltk/pathsec.py:752,783), so only the global allowed-roots check runs. The O_NOFOLLOW in _hardened_open (pathsec.py:676-731) protects only the final path component, so an intermediate-directory symlink inside the corpus root pointing at a sibling allowed root is followed by the kernel. A caller who places such a symlink (or loads an untrusted corpus containing one) can read any file that open() would refuse — files outside the corpus root yet inside the global NLTK data sandbox — via PlaintextCorpusReader.words([...]) / SyntaxCorpusReader.words([...]) (and the abspaths()-returned pointer), defeating the scoped escape protection that GHSA-p4rw-class fixes and test_required_root_blocks_symlink_escape were added for.
Details
Root cause: two sibling file-access channels on the same CorpusReader disagree about the scoped sandbox.
CorpusReader.open()(api.py:235-257) — the guarded channel:- Layer 1 lexical guard (
api.py:240-242) rejects absolute paths and... - Layer 2 scoped guard (
api.py:246-249) callspathsec.validate_path(path, context="CorpusReader", required_root=self._root). - The
required_rootbranch (pathsec.py:168-179) resolves the target withPath(raw).resolve()and raisesValueErrorwhentarget.is_relative_to(scoped_root)is false.
- Layer 1 lexical guard (
The view-method channel —
abspaths()→FileSystemPathPointer→pathsec.open(required_root=None):CorpusReader.abspath()(api.py:174-183) andabspaths()(api.py:185-217) returnself._root.join(f)with novalidate_pathcall.FileSystemPathPointer.join()(data.py:452-469) only normalizes lexically (normpath+ root-prefixstartswith); it never callsos.path.realpath/Path.resolve, so the intermediate symlink is preserved verbatim.FileSystemPathPointer.open()(data.py:438-447) calls_secure_open(self._path, "rb")(aliased frompathsec.open) with norequired_root, sopathsec.open(pathsec.py:752) uses its defaultrequired_root=Noneandvalidate_path(pathsec.py:783) runs only the global allowed-roots check (pathsec.py:181-207).- Under
ENFORCE=True+ POSIX,_hardened_open(pathsec.py:676-731) opens withO_NOFOLLOW(pathsec.py:705) — but that flag only refuses a symlink in the final component; an intermediate directory symlink (corpus/sub -> <other allowed root>) is followed by the kernel. The post-open fd realpath re-validation (pathsec.py:728-731) again usesrequired_root=None, and since the target is inside an allowed root it passes.
The view methods hand the unguarded pointers straight to the stream views:
PlaintextCorpusReader.words/sents/paras(plaintext.py:67-118, abspaths at76/96/116) andchapters(plaintext.py:230).SyntaxCorpusReader.parsed_sents/tagged_sents/sents/tagged_words/words(api.py:473-519, abspaths at478/489/498/509/517).StreamBackedCorpusView._open()(nltk/corpus/reader/util.py:203-216) callsself._fileid.open(self._encoding)on thePathPointer(util.py:210), landing in therequired_root=Nonepath above.
Net effect (observed): the identical fileid "sub/secret.txt" is rejected by `reader.open()
References
- GHSA-g58v-j9g9-5gfg on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-g58v-j9g9-5gfg
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-128137
- Web: https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3761
- Web: https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/9f7cf06b4af4ca5c65381ed0abc17e989dc54400
- Package: https://github.com/nltk/nltk
- Web: https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.4
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About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.