CVE-2026-84363: Hono: Query parser reads parameters after the URL fragment, causing cache-key and proxy interpretation differentials

Medium CVSS 5.9

OSV id
GHSA-crvj-82cr-hjcx
Also known as
CVE-2026-84363
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
hono
npm
< 4.13.5 4.13.5

Versions we track that it affects: hono 4.13.3

How to fix it

Upgrade hono to 4.13.5 or later.

npm install hono@4.13.5
# if it is an indirect dependency: npm update hono (or npm audit fix)
  • If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or force the version with "overrides" (npm), "resolutions" (Yarn) or "pnpm.overrides" (pnpm) in package.json.
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

Hono's query parsing does not stop at the URL fragment: a ? appearing after a # is treated as the start of a query string. As a result, the application can read request parameters that no other component involved in handling the request can see.

Details

A fragment is never part of the query, and every standard URL consumer — browsers, new URL(), reverse proxies — ignores everything from the first # onward. Hono's routing followed that rule; its query helpers did not.

For one and the same request, this produces an interpretation differential:

  • A component in front of the application that inspects the query string — filtering rules, parameter allow/deny lists, access logging — observes no parameters, while the application reads and acts on them.
  • The cache middleware removed the fragment when building its cache key, so a response influenced by parameters carried inside the fragment could be stored under a key that did not reflect them and later returned to other users.

The same divergence reaches request validation and any middleware that reads query parameters.

This requires a request target containing a literal # to reach the application. Deployments on runtimes that normalise such a target — including Cloudflare Workers — are not affected, and neither are those behind an intermediary that strips the fragment.

Impact

An attacker can cause the application to act on parameters that components in front of it never observe.

This may lead to:

  • filtering rules, allow/deny lists, and audit logging being blind to parameters the application still processes
  • a cached response being stored under a key that does not reflect the parameters used to produce it, and served to other users
  • stored cross-site scripting, where such a parameter is reflected into a cached HTML response without escaping

This issue affects applications that read query parameters and run on a runtime that passes a literal # through to the request URL.

References

Am I affected?

Upload or paste your lockfile. We check every package version in it against OSV.dev, this advisory included, and email you the vulnerable ones with the version that fixes them. Free, and no account needed.

or paste its content

Needed when you paste. package.json and pyproject.toml only have version ranges: use the lockfile next to them.

Only package names and versions are checked; the file itself is not kept. We use your email to send this report and nothing else unless you tick the box above. Privacy policy.

About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.