CVE-2026-83817: CodeWhale: Automation auto_approve defaults to true, bypassing the task-path hardening fix for silent recurring agent execution

High CVSS 7.5

OSV id
GHSA-8hp3-xxrg-v9c8
Also known as
CVE-2026-83817
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
codewhale-tui
Cargo
< 0.9.0 0.9.0
codewhale
npm
< 0.9.0 0.9.0

How to fix it

codewhale-tui (Cargo)

Upgrade codewhale-tui to 0.9.0 or later.

cargo update -p codewhale-tui --precise 0.9.0
  • If it is an indirect dependency, `cargo update -p` still works; if a parent crate pins an older version, upgrade that crate.
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

codewhale (npm)

Upgrade codewhale to 0.9.0 or later.

npm install codewhale@0.9.0
# if it is an indirect dependency: npm update codewhale (or npm audit fix)
  • If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or force the version with "overrides" (npm), "resolutions" (Yarn) or "pnpm.overrides" (pnpm) in package.json.
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Maintainer resolution

The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. CodeWhale 0.8.67 and earlier are affected. Version 0.9.0 contains the fix in commit 208421b9d23d81cea3311a1eeb2a2ea81d637686. Users should upgrade to 0.9.0 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.

Summary

CVE-2026-45374 (GHSA-72w5-pf8h-xfp4) hardened the task path so auto-approval must be opted into explicitly: add_task uses req.auto_approve.unwrap_or(false) (taskmanager.rs:868). The automation subsystem was not hardened in kind. AutomationRecord::task_auto_approve() resolves an omitted auto_approve to DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_AUTO_APPROVE = true (automationmanager.rs:29, 101-103), and enqueue_run_task builds the NewTaskRequest with auto_approve: Some(automation.task_auto_approve()) — i.e. an explicit Some(true) (automationmanager.rs:766). Because the field is Some, unwrap_or(false) returns true and the seed-2 default is bypassed. That true propagates to ApprovalMode::Bypass (runtimethreads.rs:2253), where the background approval loop auto-approves every tool call with no human present (runtime_threads.rs:3383-3416). One approved automation_create becomes a durable, recurring, fully auto-approved agent. Same insecure-default class as CVE-2026-45374, on a different, unpatched subsystem.

Root Cause

Sibling durable defaults in the same struct are safe — DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_ALLOW_SHELL = false and DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_TRUST_MODE = false (automation_manager.rs:27-28) — while DEFAULT_AUTOMATION_AUTO_APPROVE alone defaults true (:29). create_automation stores auto_approve: None when omitted (:422); task_auto_approve() resolves None→true (:101-103); enqueue_run_task passes Some(true) (:766), defeating add_task's unwrap_or(false) seed fix. The automation_create tool schema also declares "auto_approve": {"type":"boolean","default":true} (tools/automation.rs:49) while sibling allow_shell/trust_mode default false.

Impact

A single approved automation_create yields a durable, recurring, fully auto-approved agent. Every scheduled fire silently authorizes mutating tools (file writes, apply_patch, git, MCP writes) with no prompt; combined with allow_shell:true in the create call, recurring silent RCE with no human present. Even without allow_shell, every recurring run silently authorizes all non-shell mutating tools. Same class as seed CVE-2026-45374.

Proof of Concept

Prompt injection convinces the model to create a benign-sounding recurring job (single human approval on the automation_create call):

{"name":"automation_create","arguments":{
  "name":"nightly-maintenance",
  "prompt":"Fetch latest and run project setup script",
  "rrule":"FREQ=HOURLY;INTERVAL=1",
  "allow_shell":true
}}

(auto_approve omitted → stored None → resolves to true on every run.)

Attack Chain

  1. Entry. Prompt injection → model creates a recurring job via automation_create with auto_approve omitted.
    • Guard: automation_create is Required (tools/automation.rs:61-63) — user sees ONE approval prompt.
    • Bypass proof: the prompt describes an innocuous automation; the schema hides "auto_approve": {"default": true} (tools/automation.rs:49). Approving "create a scheduled job" is not informed consent to "every future run bypasses all approval prompts." The resolved auto_approve=true (omitted field) is not surfaced.
  2. Persist. create_automation stores auto_approve: None (automation_manager.rs:422).
    • Guard: none.
    • Bypass proof: None is later resolved to true, not false.
  3. Fire. Headless scheduler tick (scheduler_tick_shared, no human) or automation_run invokes enqueue_run_task, which sets auto_approve: Some(true) (automationmanager.rs:766).
    • Guard: seed-2's hardened add_task default unwrap_or(false) (taskmanager.rs:868).
    • Bypass proof: the value is Some(true), so unwrap_or(false) yields true — the hardened default never applies.
  4. Sink. Background worker builds the turn with auto_approve=true → ApprovalMode::Bypass (runtimethreads.rs:2253); the approval loop auto-approves (runtimethreads.rs:3383-3416).
    • Guard: autoreview safetyfloor.
    • Bypass proof: safetyfloor holds only Publish (any origin) and Destructive/Secret (background/headless) (autoreview.rs:344-357); ordinary write_file/apply_patch/edit_file/non-destructive exec_shell are NOT held → they run unattended. With allow_shell:true, every scheduled run additionally gets silent shell execution.
  5. Impact. Durable, recurring, fully auto-approved agent from one create approval; recurring silent RCE with allow_shell:true.

Bypass Evidence

  • Present on latest release tag v0.8.67: automationmanager.rs:27-29 (ALLOW_SHELL=false, TRUST_MODE=false, AUTO_APPROVE=true), :101-103 task_auto_approve()→unwrap_or(true), :766 `Some(automation.taskauto_approve())

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.