CVE-2026-75521: Miren Runtime: Authentication bypass in RPC layer: unverified TLS client certificates grant cluster superuser access
Critical
- OSV id
- GHSA-8fh7-7q4q-cq52
- Also known as
- CVE-2026-75521
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| miren.dev/runtime Go |
< 0.11.1 | 0.11.1 |
How to fix it
Upgrade miren.dev/runtime to 0.11.1 or later.
go get miren.dev/runtime@v0.11.1
go mod tidy
- Indirect Go modules are upgraded the same way (`go get module@version`).
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
Summary
The Miren Runtime RPC server (QUIC/HTTP3, default port :8443) requested TLS
client certificates but never verified that a presented certificate chained to
the cluster Certificate Authority. Because a client-certificate identity is
granted a blanket RBAC bypass, any party able to reach the RPC listener could
present a forged, self-signed certificate and be authenticated as a cluster
superuser — no valid CA signature, credential, or prior authorization
required.
Impact
This is a complete, unauthenticated authentication bypass against the cluster control plane. An attacker who can reach the RPC port can perform any RPC operation with full privileges: enumerate and manipulate entities, apps, sandboxes, disks, and other cluster resources. This yields full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the cluster and everything it orchestrates.
Exposure is network-reachability–gated only. Deployments that expose :8443
beyond a trusted network (e.g. 0.0.0.0/0) are remotely exploitable from the
internet by anyone; deployments that restrict :8443 to a trusted network are
exploitable by any party with access to that network.
Due to a lack of ability to detect if the RPC has been accessed unauthorized, Miren recommends that all applications are redeployed and any credentials reference in environment variables are rotated. A read-only script to help review standing access, recent changes, and the exact secrets to rotate is available at https://github.com/mirendev/runtime/tree/089582a132f7fc1e1d5b5c0aee1e0911535fed53/scripts/security/audit-exposure.
Details
Three independent factors combined to produce the bypass:
The listener never verified the client-certificate chain. When a cluster CA was configured, the RPC listener used
tls.RequestClientCert, which requests a client certificate but does not verify it against the configuredClientCAs.tls.ConnectionState.VerifiedChainswas therefore always empty, and noVerifyPeerCertificate/VerifyConnectionhook re-checked the chain.The authenticator derived identity from an unverified certificate. The RPC authenticators read
PeerCertificates[0].Subject.CommonNamedirectly as the caller identity, with methodcert, without checking that the chain had been verified.Authorization granted a blanket bypass to certificate identities. The authorizer returned "allowed" for any
cert-method identity, skipping all RBAC checks.Go's TLS client only presents a certificate whose issuer Distinguished Name matches a CA advertised by the server, but that comparison is on the (public, non-secret) DN bytes only — it does not require a valid signature from the CA. An attacker can therefore mint a self-signed certificate whose issuer DN is byte-identical to the cluster CA subject, signed with an attacker-controlled key. The stock client presents it, and the vulnerable server accepts it and trusts its CommonName as a superuser identity.
Patches
Fixed by verifying the client-certificate chain before trusting it:
- The listener now uses
tls.VerifyClientCertIfGivenwhen a cluster CA is configured. A presented certificate must chain to the configured CA to complete the handshake, while certless callers (JWT/OIDC, which authenticate via theAuthorizationheader) are still admitted. As defense in depth, both RPC authenticators now require a non-empty
VerifiedChainsbefore deriving an identity from a client certificate.Users should upgrade to the patched release and restart the server so the new listener configuration takes effect.
Workarounds
Until the patch is deployed, restrict network access to the RPC port (:8443)
so that it is not reachable from untrusted networks — remove any
0.0.0.0/0 ingress and limit it to trusted management networks. This is a
containment measure only and does not remove the underlying vulnerability.
References
- GHSA-8fh7-7q4q-cq52 on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/mirendev/runtime/security/advisories/GHSA-8fh7-7q4q-cq52
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75521
- Web: https://github.com/mirendev/runtime/commit/e2159c8c8559da3f1c1485b463c794d656cd2fe4
- Package: https://github.com/mirendev/runtime
- Web: https://github.com/mirendev/runtime/releases/tag/v0.11.1
Am I affected?
Upload or paste your lockfile. We check every package version in it against OSV.dev, this advisory included, and email you the vulnerable ones with the version that fixes them. Free, and no account needed.
About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.