CVE-2026-110816: qs : qs.stringify with arrayFormat 'comma' throws an uncaught TypeError on array elements carrying a non-callable own toString (DoS)

Medium CVSS 5.3

OSV id
GHSA-6pq8-jhm2-2vcw
Also known as
CVE-2026-110816
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
qs
npm
>= 6.7.0, < 6.16.1 6.16.1

Versions we track that it affects: qs 6.15.3

How to fix it

Upgrade qs to 6.16.1 or later.

npm install qs@6.16.1
# if it is an indirect dependency: npm update qs (or npm audit fix)
  • If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or force the version with "overrides" (npm), "resolutions" (Yarn) or "pnpm.overrides" (pnpm) in package.json.
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

qs.stringify(obj, { arrayFormat: 'comma' }) throws an uncaught TypeError: Cannot convert object to primitive value when an array in obj contains an element that carries an own, non-callable toString property (for example { a: [ { toString: 'x' } ] }). A remote, unauthenticated attacker who can influence an object that the application later re-serializes with the comma array format triggers the throw. In a service that lacks a synchronous error boundary around the serialization call, the uncaught exception crashes the worker process, producing a denial of service.

Root Cause

When arrayFormat: 'comma' is selected, the comma branch collapses the whole array into a single value via Array.prototype.join, or, under encodeValuesOnly: true, maps each element through the value encoder before joining. Both paths perform an implicit string coercion (ToPrimitive with hint "string") on each element. For an object whose own toString is a non-callable value, coercion skips the shadowed non-callable toString, falls through to Object.prototype.valueOf (which returns the object rather than a primitive), and throws. The comma branch runs this coercion before the per-element null and skip handling in the main loop, so nothing downstream can neutralize the hostile element, and the throw is never caught inside the library.

lib/stringify.js  (comma-array branch)
  line 152-154: obj = utils.maybeMap(obj, function (v) { return v == null ? v : encoder(v); });  // encodeValuesOnly path
  line 156:     objKeys = [{ value: obj.length > 0 ? obj.join(',') || null : void undefined }];   // default comma path
lib/utils.js
  line 292:     string = String(str);   // value encoder coercion reached via the encodeValuesOnly path

Impact

Prerequisites: the application calls qs.stringify with arrayFormat: 'comma' (a documented, supported option) on an object whose shape can be influenced by attacker input. Attacker-controllable sources include qs.parse(input, { allowPrototypes: true }), which retains a toString segment (Express 4's default query parser, Express 5's extended query parser, and body-parser's extended urlencoded parser all set it), qs.parse(input, { plainObjects: true }), whose null-prototype elements throw even without a toString key (eg, a[][b]=c), and JSON.parse of a request body, which needs no qs parse option at all. No authentication or user interaction is required. Demonstrated capability: a single request forces an uncaught synchronous TypeError in the serialization call. In a naive single-process Node service with no synchronous error boundary, this crashes the process and takes the service offline (availability impact). Under a framework such as Express that traps synchronous handler throws, the plausible outcome is a per-request 500 rather than a full outage; that lower-impact case is noted but not the worst credible supported deployment. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact, no memory unsafety, and no prototype pollution.

Proof of Concept

Install qs at the affected version (for example 6.16.0) and run the following script with Node.js. No network setup is required; it demonstrates the throw in isolation.

var qs = require('qs');

// Source A: qs.parse with allowPrototypes retains the hostile toString segment
qs.stringify(qs.parse('a[0][toString]=x', { allowPrototypes: true }), { arrayFormat: 'comma' });

// Source B: a JSON request body, no qs parse option needed
qs.stringify(JSON.parse('{"a":[{"toString":"x"}]}'), { arrayFormat: 'comma' });

// Also affected: the encodeValuesOnly sub-path
qs.stringify(JSON.parse('{"a":[{"toString":"x"}]}'), { arrayFormat: 'comma', encodeValuesOnly: true });
A default-join (allowPrototypes) => THREW: TypeError: Cannot convert object to primitive value
B default-join (JSON.parse) => THREW: TypeError: Cannot convert object to primitive value
C encodeValuesOnly path => THREW: TypeError: Cannot convert object to primitive value
N2 callable toString => NO THROW; output="a=z"
N3 isBuffer vector (CVE-2026-82417) => NO THROW; output="a%5Bconstructor%5D%5BisBuffer%5D=x"
qs version: 6.16.0

Attack Chain

  1. Exposure: A remote, unauthenticated request reaches an endpoint whose handler eventually serializes attacker-influenced data with qs.stringify(obj, { arrayFormat: 'comma' }).
  2. Control: The attacker supplies data that becomes { a: [ { toString: <non-callable value> } ] }, either via a[0][toString]=x parsed with allowPrototypes, or via a JSON body {"a":[{"toString":"x"}]}.
  3. Path: In stringify, the primitive/buffer guard at lib/stringify.js:134 is false for an array, so control reaches the comma branch at lib/stringify.js:149.
  4. Guard: On the encodeValuesOnly path, the closure v == null ? v : encoder(v) at lib/stringify.js:152-154 passes only null/undefined through; a non-null object still reaches the encoder. The default path s

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.