CVE-2026-77316: Flyto2 Core: SSRF guard bypass via DNS rebinding (validate_url_ssrf resolves-then-connects without pinning)

High CVSS 7.1

OSV id
GHSA-6pm8-6f34-9v3g
Also known as
CVE-2026-77316
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
flyto-core
PyPI
< 2.26.8 2.26.8

How to fix it

Upgrade flyto-core to 2.26.8 or later.

# in requirements.txt: change the line to flyto-core==2.26.8
pip install -r requirements.txt
  • If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or add a minimum version constraint for it (e.g. in constraints.txt, or as a dependency in pyproject.toml).
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

[MEDIUM] SSRF guard bypass via DNS rebinding — validateurlssrf resolves-then-connects without pinning

  • CWE: CWE-918 (SSRF) / CWE-367 (TOCTOU).
  • CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N = 6.8 Medium (AC:H — needs attacker-controlled DNS with a low/zero TTL and to flip the answer between the guard's lookup and the connection's lookup; S:C — reaches internal/metadata services the guard is meant to block; C:H — e.g. cloud metadata credentials at 169.254.169.254).
  • Affected component: flyto-core (PyPI flyto-core), HEAD ae2b38e (v2.26.7). src/core/utils.py::validate_url_ssrf (resolution at getaddrinfo ~L512, is_private_ip check ~L515) and every consumer: guarded_aiohttp_request(), enforce_outbound_url()/validate_url_with_env_config() — i.e. http.get/request/batch, graphql.query/mutation, monitor.http_check, notification.{slack,discord,teams}, ai.vision_analyze, verify.visual_diff, browser.proxy_rotate, etc.
  • Relationship: Incomplete hardening of the SSRF-guard family (GHSA-pgwh-4jj4-qm8v, GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc, GHSA-794r-5rp2-fpg8/CVE-2026-55787). Those fixes added per-module coverage, redirect revalidation, and IPv6-transition range-checks — but none pins the resolved address, so the guard's resolve-then-connect gap defeats all of them.

Root cause

validate_url_ssrf() resolves the hostname with socket.getaddrinfo() and rejects the URL if any resolved IP is private. It then returns the URL string (hostname intact). The caller (guarded_aiohttp_request: validate_url_with_env_config(url) then session.request(method, url, ...)) hands the hostname to aiohttp, which performs an independent second DNS resolution at connect time. The validated IP is never pinned for the connection, so an attacker whose authoritative DNS returns a public A record for the guard's lookup and a private/loopback/metadata address for the connection's lookup reaches internal space. aiohttp resolves via its own resolver, distinct from the guard's socket.getaddrinfo, so the two lookups are genuinely separate — one flip is sufficient.

Reachability

  1. Attacker controls DNS for rebind.attacker.test (TTL 0), and drives any guarded HTTP module with url=http://rebind.attacker.test/ (recipe / MCP execute_module).
  2. Guard: getaddrinfo → public IP → is_private_ip false → URL allowed.
  3. Outbound request: aiohttp re-resolves rebind.attacker.test → attacker now answers 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254 → connects to the internal target. Redirect revalidation (GHSA-c9hr) does not help — the initial hop already rebinds.

Executable PoC (benign, local; deterministic)

The attacker's TTL=0 flip is modelled by making socket.getaddrinfo return public on lookup #1 (the guard's) and loopback on later lookups (the connection's); a raw local TCP sentinel stands in for the internal service. No payload is sent.

# (full source: findings/flyto-core/raw/poc_dns_rebinding.py)
# guard sees resolution #1 (public) -> ALLOWS;  connect re-resolves (127.0.0.1) -> hits sentinel
validate_url_ssrf("http://rebind.attacker.test:8080/")     # ALLOWED
socket.create_connection(("rebind.attacker.test", 8080))   # lands on 127.0.0.1 sentinel

Observed output:

[guard] validate_url_ssrf ALLOWED http://rebind.attacker.test:8080/  (saw public 93.184.216.34 on resolution #1)
[connect] outbound request re-resolved rebind.attacker.test -> 127.0.0.1 and reached the INTERNAL sentinel: True
BUG CONFIRMED: guard passed but connection reached the private/internal IP (DNS rebinding, no IP pin)

Adversarial re-read

  • Is the getaddrinfo monkeypatch cheating? No — it deterministically models an attacker's TTL=0 authoritative DNS returning different answers to two separate lookups. The code gap is real and unavoidable: validate_url_with_env_config(url) resolves once, then session.request(url) resolves again with no pin.
  • Does aiohttp's DNS cache prevent it? No — the guard's socket.getaddrinfo and aiohttp's resolver are independent; aiohttp caches its OWN (malicious) lookup, not the guard's.
  • Does redirect revalidation (GHSA-c9hr) block it? No — the first hop rebinds before any redirect.
  • Multiple A records? The guard loops all getaddrinfo results and rejects if any is private, so static multi-record does not bypass; only a time-of-use flip does.
  • Result: no concrete blocker. CONFIRMED (Medium; AC:H because it needs attacker DNS + a flip).

Remediation

Pin the validated address: resolve once, validate every returned IP, then connect to the pinned IP (not the hostname) — e.g. pass the resolved address to aiohttp via a custom resolver/TCPConnector (or set the Host header and connect by IP), so the guard's decision and the socket target are the same address. Apply for every hop in guarded_aiohttp_request. Alternatively, use a resolver wrapper that validates inside the connect path.

Confidence

High that the resolve-

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.